In the Fifth Chapter of the P (ramana) S (amuccaya) Dignaga presents the theory of anyapoha (exclusion of others) which may be regarded as his most original contribution to Indian logicl). Dignaga declares in the introductory verse (K.1) that verbal cognition (fabda) is nothing but inference (anumana) because both of them function on the principle of anyapoha. He refutes four possible candidates for the meaning of a word (sabdartha), viz. (i) an individual (bheda),
(ii) a universal (jati), (iii) a relation (sambandha) between them and (iv) a thing possessing a universal (jatimat J tadvat), and concludes that the meaning of a word is anyapoha (KK. 2-11). Here he inserts two summarizing verses (KK.
& 13)2). He then deals with the relation of co-reference (sarnanadhikaranya)
and that of qualifier-qualificand (visesanavisesyabhava) with regard to compound expressions such as nilotpala (a blue lotus) (KK. 14-25ab). Next he gives a detailed account of the apoha theory, with special emphasis on the scope of exclusion (KK. 25cd-38). He also criticizes the Samkhya position (KK. [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] and discusses the meaning of a sentence (vakyartha) (KK. 46-49). In the final verse (K.50) he takes up a few additional topics and concludes that the other so-called pramanas, i.e., upamana and so on, should be regarded as inference. (iii) The word sat neither excludes nor encompasses the meanings of dravya, parthiva, vrksa etc., for it awakens expectation (akahksana) of determining which particular (bheda) it actually refers to whether something called existent is, for instance, a substance or a quality (guna) or an action (karman) -or it raises doubt (samdeha) as to which particular it refers to. Generally speaking,
A UNIVERSAL WORD OF HIGHER ORDER NEITHER EXCLUDES NOR ENCOMPASSES THE MEANINGS OF UNIVERSAL WORDS OF LOWER ORDER
Rule 118). The difference between Dignaga's formulation and the grammarians' is due to the f act that the former is made from the point of view of the speaker, while the latter is made from that of the listener.
(iii) A universal, say rapatva (colorness), is generally believed to be a ground for applying (pravrttinimitta) a word, say rup, to those which are supposed to possess that universal, e.g. blue, yellow, etc. Dignaga rejects this view and concludes that we employ a certain word for a certain group of objects only because we follow the linguistic convention generally accepted by ordinary 3) The table has been reconstructed from the information given in PS, V, K. 25
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